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ABSTRACT
In this paper, we extend the growth model to include ﬁrm-speciﬁc technology capital and use it
to assess the gains from opening to foreign direct investment. A ﬁrm’s technology capital is its
unique know-how from investing in research and development, brands, and organization capital.
Technology capital is distinguished from other forms of capital in that a ﬁrm can use it simultane-
ously in multiple domestic and foreign locations. A country can exploit foreign technology capital
by permitting direct investment by foreign multinationals. In both steady-state and transitional
analyses, the extended growth model predicts large gains to being open.
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Economists generally agree that being open has large economic beneﬁts. This view is
based mostly on empirical evidence [9, 13] because existing economic theory provides little
support for large beneﬁts. Here we develop a theoretical framework and use it to conclude
that openness to foreign direct investment (FDI) by multinationals yields large gains in
productivity. The theoretical framework is an extension of the standard growth model that
has proven so useful in macroeconomics.
The extension has two key features: ﬁrm-speciﬁc technology capital and locations.
A ﬁrm’s technology capital is its unique know-how, accumulated from investing in such
things as research and development (R&D), organization capital, and brands. Technology
capital is distinguished from other types of capital in that a ﬁrm can use it simultaneously
in multiple domestic and foreign locations.1 A ﬁrm with technology capital realizes rents at
every location in which it operates because its location technology production sets display
decreasing returns to scale beyond some point. Permitting FDI is the mechanism by which
foreign technology capital is exploited in a given country. Opening to FDI beneﬁts both the
country that opens up and the countries that make the foreign direct investment.
We derive the aggregate production function and ﬁnd that it displays constant re-
turns to scale, as does the aggregate production function for the standard growth model.
Consequently, price taking is assumed. We show that even though there is a constant re-
turns to scale technology, there are increasing returns with respect to the size of a country
as measured by the number of its locations, but there are no increasing returns with respect
to the factor inputs: technology capital, plant-speciﬁc capital, and services of labor.2
We quantify our model with standard parameter values and use it to predict steady
1In the language of classical general equilibrium theory, a unit of technology capital is a set of technologies,
with one technology for each location.
2In [11], to address current account issues, we ﬁnd it necessary to introduce two varieties of plant-
speciﬁc capital, namely, tangible and production-unit speciﬁc intangible capital. Diﬀerences in tax treatments
and reporting necessitated this distinction. For the issues addressed in this paper, however, we need not
and do not make the distinction between plant-speciﬁc tangible and intangible capital. The extension is
straightforward, but complicates the notation. All that needs to be done is to introduce an aggregator at
the production-unit level.
1states and transition paths as countries move from being closed to being open. We ﬁnd that
overall, the model predicts what the empirical evidence has suggested: large gains to open-
ness. More speciﬁcally, we ﬁnd large increases in productivity when similar countries form
an economic union that requires openness between members. We also ﬁnd that unilateral
opening is mutually beneﬁcial, with most of the beneﬁts going to the country that opens
and allows foreign multinationals to produce within its borders. When countries are open,
the world stock of technology capital, not its distribution across countries is what matters.
Our abstraction focuses on the role of openness to FDI in making possible the use of
foreign production know-how in other countries. Also associated with economic integration
are the almost certain gains to total factor productivity (TFP), which amplify the direct
gains from openness. We thus do some additional analysis that assumes the TFP of a
country that becomes open increases over time and eventually reaches the TFP level of the
already open countries. Our results strongly suggest that these indirect beneﬁts of opening
are as quantitatively important as the direct beneﬁts.
Ramondo [12] and Burstein and Monge-Naranjo [3] are two related papers that con-
sider the gains of countries becoming more open. Ramondo modiﬁes the static trade model
of Eaton and Kortum [5] by assuming that country-level productivities, rather than goods,
are mobile. In Ramondo, countries become more open as they lower the ﬁxed costs of estab-
lishing a foreign plant, which in turn leads to more multinational production and higher real
incomes. Burstein and Monge-Naranjo modify the standard growth model by modeling the
ﬁrm as a manager that employs capital and labor as in Lucas [8]. Countries become more
open as they lower tax rates on managerial earnings, which leads to a reallocation of man-
agers. Neither Ramondo nor Burstein and Monge-Naranjo include a factor like technology
capital that is both accumulated know-how and used in multiple locations.
Our paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present empirical evidence that
becoming open to FDI and becoming economically integrated with advanced industrial
economies leads to the previously closed country catching up to already open countries
in terms of economic development. In Section 3 we present theoretical support for the em-
2pirical evidence that a strong, positive association exists between economic integration and
productivity gains. We start by developing an aggregation theory underlying our aggregate
production function. We then develop formulas for the steady state and for the transition
paths, and use these formulas to assess the importance of openness for productivity and
consumption. Section 4 concludes.
2. Empirical evidence
Empirical evidence clearly suggests that, in general, becoming economically integrated
with other countries leads to improvements in the economic development of countries pre-
viously closed. Our measure of development is gross domestic product (GDP) per hours
worked, which is what we mean by the term productivity. We examine what has happened
to productivity in various countries over time as they have become more economically in-
tegrated. Some of the countries we study have joined economic unions of countries, while
others have opened their economies in less formal ways. We compare the productivities of
countries that are opening to those of others that were already relatively open during the
same time periods. In all the newly opened countries, we see that economic integration
appears to have boosted productivity. We also see that relatively closed countries have low
or even falling productivity.
2.1. Europe
Here we review the empirical evidence that membership in the European Union (EU),
a relatively open set of countries, results in a country catching up to the industrial leader.
In 1957, six countries—Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and
West Germany—signed the Treaty of Rome to form what became the European Union. We
will call this group the EU-6. Figure 1 plots our GDP per hour measure of productivity for
1900–2005 for these six countries compared to that of the United States during the same
time period. Over the 30 years following the signing of the treaty, the productivity of these
countries rose nearly to the U.S. level. After 40 years, it surpassed that level.
3Figure 1: EU-6 Labor Productivity as a Percentage of US (1900–2005)

















Figure 2: 1973 Joiners’ Labor Productivity as a Percentage of EU-6 (1960–2005)











4Figure 3: 1995 Joiners’ Labor Productivity as a Percentage of EU-6 (1960–2005)











Figure 4: Switzerland’s Labor Productivity as a Percentage of EU-6 (1960–2005)







5The EU has expanded several times since 1957, so we can review the productivity
of the joining countries in each expansion to see if they, too, seem to have gained from the
experience. Figure 2 plots the aggregate productivity of the three countries that joined the
EU in 1973—Denmark, Ireland, and the United Kingdom—relative to the productivity of
the original EU-6. The 1973 group is dominated by the experience of the United Kingdom
because its population is by far the largest among the three. Still, we can see in the ﬁgure
that the relative productivity of the 1973 group fell dramatically just before the countries
joined the EU. Just after joining, their relative productivity leveled oﬀ and then rose slightly.3
Another group of three countries—Austria, Finland, and Sweden—joined the EU in
1995. Figure 3 shows that collectively, the productivity of these countries relative to that
of the EU-6 was also falling until the countries joined the EU; then it turned around and
gained ground.
Switzerland serves as an example of what has happened to a Western European
country that has not joined the EU. Figure 4 shows that its relative productivity, like that
of the 1995 joiners, lost ground before 1995. Unlike the 1995 joiners, however, Switzerland’s
productivity lost ground after 1995 as well. Not opening its economy to a large group of
industrialized European countries did not help Switzerland’s productivity.
More recently, in 2004, eight Central European countries—the Czech Republic, Es-
tonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia—joined the European
Union. We will call this group the CE-8. Figure 5 plots their post-1989 performance, again
compared to that of the original EU-6. The ﬁgure shows some impressive gains beginning
around the time of the collapse of the Soviet Union and continuing as these countries moved
toward EU membership. After joining the EU in 2004, they had further gains. The fact
that EU membership fosters openness suggests that these 2004 EU joiners are on their way
to productivity closer to that of the rest of the EU.
3Bourl` es and Cette [2] make a human capital adjustment for France and estimate that French 2002
productivity is actually 8 percent lower than U.S. productivity, and not 7 percent higher, when corrections
are made for workforce composition. This suggests that the productivities of the 1973 joiners relative to the
EU-6 since 1985 could well be 5 to 10 percent higher than the plotted values in Figure 2.
6Figure 5: CE-8 Labor Productivity as a Percentage of EU-6 (1989–2005)
















A region of the world that has been relatively closed in the last half of the 20th century
is South America [4]. Figure 6 shows the aggregate productivity of nine countries relative
to the United States. The nine included are Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia,
Ecuador, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela. As Figure 6 shows, during the years between 1960
and 2005, the productivity of these relatively closed countries shrank from 36 percent of the
U.S. level to only 26 percent.
Asia, in contrast, has done much better. Economic openness has increased lately in 12
Asian countries, including China, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Pakistan,
the Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand. Figure 7 shows that as these
countries have become more economically integrated with advanced industrialized countries,
their productivity has beneﬁted. It is still low compared to that of the United States, but
unlike that of the relatively closed South American countries, the gap is narrowing fast.
Between 1960 and 2005, it increased from 8.4 percent to 17 percent of U.S. productivity.
7Figure 6: South American Labor Productivity as a Percentage of US (1960–2005)
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Figure 7: Asian Labor Productivity as a Percentage of US (1960–2005)



















8To summarize the empirical evidence, we see a strong positive association between
economic integration of countries and gains in their productivity.
3. Theoretical evidence
We now provide theoretical support for a strong positive association between economic
integration and productivity gains, in the case in which opening up leads to increased foreign
direct investment. We do this by extending the growth model to include technology capital
and work out the implication of that extension for the aggregate production of a country
and the model’s equilibrium under various degrees of openness. We quantify the steady-state
gains as well as the gains during the transition of an economy as it adjusts from being closed
to being open. By way of a set of empirically relevant examples, we demonstrate that the
gains to opening to FDI are large.
3.1. The model extension
In this section, we extend the growth model to include technology capital. We start
with assumptions on the production technology and then derive the aggregate production
function of a country that is partially open. The ﬁnal step is laying out the rest of the model.
Production Technology
The model that we develop retains the standard inputs to production. They are






i , α ∈ (0,1).




i , φ ∈ (0,1) (1)
9units of country i ﬁnal output. Here, Ai is the country-speciﬁc TFP parameter.
Note that the owner of a unit of technology capital “owns” the location production
function speciﬁed by (1) for every domestic location. A given unit of the composite input zi
can be used at one and only one location in country i.
Technology capital can also be used to set up operations in a foreign location. Foreign
multinationals hire capital and labor services within country i and use their own technology







1−φ, σi ∈ [0,1]
units of country i ﬁnal output. Here, σi is the measure of openness of country i. We assume
that the degree of openness of a country aﬀects the relative productivity of foreign operations
within its borders. If σi = 1, then country i is totally open to the use of foreign technology
capital within its borders. If σi = 0, then country i is totally closed to that use.
Aggregate production function
We now derive the maximal output that can be produced in a country i, i ∈ {1,...,I},
with technology level Ai, openness measure σi, and a population that we denote by Ni. As we
show below, the maximal output can be expressed as a function of aggregate factor inputs,
including the vector of technology capitals from the I countries in the world.
To derive this function, we need some notation for the measure of locations in a
country and for the stock of its technology capital. We assume that the measure of a
country’s production locations is proportional to its population, since locations correspond
to markets and some measure of people deﬁnes a market. Without loss of generality, we
set the proportionality factor relating the measure of locations and Ni to 1. Thus, Ni is
used for both the population in i and the number of locations in i. A country i ﬁrm is
a stock mi of technology capital or know-how embodied within the ﬁrm. Country i has
aggregate technology capital stock of Mi, which is the sum of the technology capital stocks
10of all domestic ﬁrms in country i.
We are now ready to derive the maximal output for country i that can be produced
given an aggregate quantity of the composite input, denoted Zi, and the technology capital
stocks {Mj}I
















The amount of the composite input used at each plant operated by a domestic ﬁrm is zd, while
the amount used at each plant operated by a foreign ﬁrm is zf. The fact that the quantity
zd is the same at each domestic plant follows from the diminishing returns assumption in
(1). For the same reason, zf is the same at each foreign plant in country i. The ﬁrst term
in (2) is the total output of domestic ﬁrms operating in i, and the second term is the total
output of foreign ﬁrms operating in i.
The resulting country i aggregate production function, after substituting for Z, is
given by
















where Ki,Li are aggregate plant-speciﬁc capital stocks and labor services in country i and
ωi = σ
1/φ




The parameter ωi in (3) is an alternative measure of openness that can be interpreted
as the fraction of country j foreign technology capital that is permitted to be used in country i
for all j  = i. A generalization of our framework has ωij be the fraction of country j technology
capital that can be used in country i. This generalization is straightforward and is needed
to deal with organizations such as the European Union.
The aggregate production functions Fi in (3) have two noteworthy features. First, the
functions display constant returns to scale in the inputs {Ki,Li,{Mj}I
j=1}. Despite this fact,
11the total output of a set of open economies (with ωi > 0) is greater than the total output
of a set of closed economies. It is as if there were increasing returns, when in fact there are
none. Second, if a country is totally open (ωi = 1), then the stock of technology capital used
in this country is the world aggregate stock of technology capital (
P
j Mj). Therefore, if we
compare living standards of two totally open countries with diﬀerent populations, we would
ﬁnd no economic advantage or disadvantage to being large.
Rest of the model
Before we can estimate the gains of openness, we must specify household preferences,
asset ownership, and the global resource constraint.




(1 + ρ)tu(ct,lt), (4)
where ct and lt are per capita consumption and per capita leisure at time t, respectively.
The utility function u is strictly increasing in both arguments and is strictly concave as well
as continuously diﬀerentiable. When we deal with balanced growth, further restrictions will
be imposed that are suﬃcient for the existence of a balanced growth equilibrium.
We assume that households in each country i collectively own Ki and Mi, and the
current account is in balance each period. Rents on the capital stocks plus labor income are
used to purchase consumption and investment goods.
The economy-wide resource constraint is
Yi = Ci + Xik + Xim + NXi,
which states that a country i’s output Yi equals consumption Ci plus investment in plant-
speciﬁc capital Xik plus investment in technology capital Xim plus net exports NXi. The
12laws of motion of the two capital stocks are the usual ones:
Ki,t+1 = (1 − δk)Kit + Xikt
Mi,t+1 = (1 − δm)Mit + Ximt,
where the depreciation rates δk, δm are positive and less than one.
Fixed parameters
To quantify the gains to opening to foreign direct investment, we need to parameterize
the model. Here, we describe those parameter values that are used in both our steady-state
analysis and our transitional analysis.
These parameter values are reported in Table I. The parameters were selected to
match (i) a labor income share of 65 percent, (ii) a plant-speciﬁc capital to output ratio of
3, (iii) a real interest rate of 4 percent, and (iv) a technology capital to output ratio of 0.5
for a country that is totally closed.4
3.2. Steady-state analysis
Having speciﬁed the details of the model, we are now ready to use it to make steady-
state predictions. We ﬁrst prove the existence of a steady state and provide an algorithm
for ﬁnding one. Because the elasticity of labor supply does not matter quantitatively for our
steady-state comparisons, we will assume here that labor is supplied inelastically.
Existence of a steady state
The world steady-state interest rate is ρ given preferences (4). The rental price of K
is therefore ρ + δk. Equating the marginal product of K to its rental prices yields the ﬁrst
4Originally, we chose φ = 0.06 and δm = 0.08. In [11], we found that a higher technology capital share φ
was needed to match U.S. current account ﬂows. The main results in [11] are not sensitive to the choice of
the depreciation rate for technology capital, δm.
13equilibrium condition
(ρ + δk)Ki = (1 − φ)αYi. (5)
A second equilibrium condition is Li = Ni, since each person is assumed to have one unit of
time and to supply it to the market.
An equilibrium relation that we use in subsequent analysis is the one obtained by


















We turn now to developing a set of equilibrium conditions that the technology capital stocks
Mi must satisfy.











where θ = (α−1)(1−φ)/(1−α(1−φ)). This follows from diﬀerentiating country i production
function (3) with respect to Mi, then using (5) and Li = Ni to eliminate Ki and Li, and
ﬁnally using (6) to eliminate the Yi that comes in when Ki is eliminated.











This is determined in essentially the same way as (7).







where M = {M1,...,MI}. Equilibrium conditions for M, which do not depend upon the
other inputs, are
ri(M) ≤ ρ + δm (8)
with equality if Mi > 0.
Proposition 1. A non-zero steady state exists.
Proof. We develop a function f(M) whose ﬁxed points are steady-state ˆ M. We use the
Kakutani ﬁxed point theorem to establish existence of a ﬁxed point.
We ﬁrst deﬁne the functions gi(M−i) to be the solution to (8) given M−i, which
denotes the I −1 dimensional vector of the Mj for j  = i. The function gi(M−i) is decreasing,
and therefore
gi(M−i) ≤ gi(0).
The convex compact set over which the mapping f is deﬁned is
∆ = {M ∈ R
I
+ : Mi ≤ gi(0) ∀ i}.
The function f: ∆ → ∆ is deﬁned as follows: function g1 is used to compute f1(M) =
g1(M−1). The vector (f1(M),M2,...,MI) and g2 are used to determine f2(M), and so forth.
This I-stage updating deﬁnes the function f.
The function f is continuous and maps convex compact set ∆ into itself. Therefore,
it has a ﬁxed point ˆ M. This ﬁxed point is not zero, for the following reason. If components
15M1 to MI−1 were all zero, then MI would be strictly positive. Thus, a non-zero steady-state
equilibrium exists.
Algorithm for ﬁnding a steady state
We now show how to construct a steady state.
Consider the system that we analyzed in the last section:





, i ∈ J ⊆ I
Mi = 0, i  ∈ J.
Given J, this system can be solved uniquely for M = {Mi}i∈I. This involves solving two
systems of linear equations. The task here is to ﬁnd J such that Mi ≥ 0 for all i.
After initializing with J = I, the iterative procedure is as follows:
• Step 1. Solve the system and check if a steady-state vector with M ≥ 0 has been
found. If not, go to step 2.
• Step 2. Remove the i from the set J for which Mi is most negative. Go to step 1.
With this algorithm, because I is a ﬁnite set, a J will eventually be found with solution
M ≥ 0.
If the M vector obtained satisﬁes (8), then we have a steady state. For the examples
considered below, the algorithm ﬁnds the unique steady-state M vector. These examples
have special structures on the {ωi,AiNi} that ensure uniqueness.
Steady-state predictions
We now apply the algorithm in four empirically motivated examples. These examples
show that there is an advantage to size even if countries are not open to FDI and there are
large gains to countries that do open to FDI.
16Example 1: Size Advantage If Countries Are Closed
The ﬁrst example considers the advantage of size for a set of totally closed economies.
This example is motivated by country comparisons prior to the rise of foreign direct invest-
ment.
Let ωi = 0 for all i. The per capita output is a function of size AN; that is,
y ∝ (AN)
φ/[(1−φ)(1−α)].
According to the model, the quantitative implication of being ten times larger than other
countries, as measured by AN, is that steady-state output will be 23.4 percent larger. This
implies large productivity gains for smaller countries forming a large economic union in which
they are open with respect to each other.
Example 2: Large Gain to Small Countries Opening
The second example has two countries, a big country and a small country with com-
mon levels of openness. This example is motivated by Canada and the United States.
Here, we assess how productivity and consumption vary with openness for a two-
country world. One country has a much larger population than the other. The two countries
could be thought of as the United States with population N1 and Canada with population
N2. Since the U.S. population is almost ten times that of Canada, we set N1 = 10 and
N2 = 1. The parameters that matter for this comparison are α and φ in the production
function (3). We assume that only Ni diﬀer. The openness measure is ω for both countries.
We set Ai = 1 for i = {1,2}, since this is just a normalization.
The equilibrium M1 and M2 can be found from equilibrium condition (8). If the
solution to
ρ + δm = ri(M), i = 1,2
is non-negative, then this solution is the equilibrium M vector. Otherwise, M2 = 0, and M1
17is the solution to
ρ + δm = r1(M1,0).
We turn now to a comparison of productivity in the two countries. Figure 8 plots
the productivity of the two countries measured against the productivity of a totally closed
small country. If ω = 0, the countries are totally closed and the ratio of productivities for
the two countries is the same as in Example 1. If ω = 1, the countries are totally open
and there is no advantage to size. By moving from totally closed to perfectly open, the big
country’s productivity rises only modestly, but the small country’s productivity increases by
29.4 percent, which is sizable.
Figure 8: Steady-State Productivities as a Function of ω
Fraction of FDI Permitted, ω












As Figure 8 shows, there is a nonlinear relation between relative productivities and
ω. Notice, for example, that there is a kink in the small country productivity at ω = 0.078.
For this and higher values of ω, the small country chooses optimally to invest only in plant-
18speciﬁc capital, since it can use the big country’s stock of technology capital. For large values
of ω, the big country’s stock is 0.55 times its own output and 0.5 times world output.
If we take into account the fact that most investment in technology capital is not
counted in GDP, we ﬁnd that the small country’s measured productivity eventually surpasses
that of the big country. Gross domestic product is output Yi less any expensed investment.
Investment in technology capital is, for the most part, intangible investment of multinationals
such as R&D and advertising, which is expensed from accounting proﬁts. As this example
shows, the big country (say, the United States) does all of the investment in M for ω > 0.078.
Thus, the measured productivity of the small country eventually exceeds that of the big
country. At ω = 1, the measured productivity of the small country is 5 percent higher than
that of the big country.
We turn now to predictions for consumption. Steady-state aggregate consumption in
the two countries is given by













Based on these formulas and our Table I parameter values, the model predicts the Table II
values of consumption per capita when ω = 0 and when ω approaches 1. The gain for the
big country is only 1.3 percent, but the gain for the small country is 26.1 percent—similar
in magnitude to the gain in productivity.
The argument for two countries generalizes to I countries. First, order the countries
so that N1 > N2 >     > NI. The value i∗ must be found such that the solution to
ri(M) = ρ + δm, i ≤ i
∗
Mi = 0, i > i
∗
(9)
satisﬁes the equilibrium condition (8). The equations in (9) can be violated in two ways. One
is if Mi < 0 for some i. Then a smaller i∗ is needed. The other way is if ri∗+1(M) > ρ + δm.
19Then a larger i∗ is needed.
Example 3: Large Gain to Forming Unions
Our third example is designed to determine the gains from expanding the size of an
economic union when the entering country adopts the same degree of openness as the existing
union members. This example is motivated by a country joining the European Union.
We deﬁne an economic union as a set of economies (typically, countries) with common
openness policy ω and totally closed with respect to the rest of the world. Let the number
of economies be I. For these examples, all members of the union have equal size, that is,
AiNi = AN for all i.
In this case, steady-state output per eﬀective person as a function of the number of
union members is
y(I) ∝ [1 + (I − 1)ω]
φ/[(1−α)(1−φ)] .
Using estimates from Table I, we see that the ratio of y(I) for ω = 1 and ω = 0 is I.108. Table
III reports relative per capita output for several values of I. As can be seen from Table III,
forming a union of 20 members increases the members’ per capita output and consumption
27 percent if ω = 2/3.
Now, suppose a country joins a union of size I = 20, thereby making the union size
I = 21 with ω = 2/3. As can be seen from Table III, this has a small eﬀect on existing
members, with balanced growth per capita output increasing only 0.5 percent. But the
increase of the joiner is large: 33.2 percent.
Example 4: Large Gain to Countries Opening Unilaterally
Now we consider and assess the gains to a country unilaterally opening to a group of
closed economies. This is similar to the situation of Chile in South America. We ﬁnd that
opening yields large gains to the opening country.
We assume that countries are of equal size, which is normalized to AN = 1. At
20the start, they are totally closed (ωi = 0). Then, one country becomes totally open to
foreign direct investment while the others remain totally closed. Assume the world has I +1




for a closed country c.
The country opening up exploits the world stock of technology capital IMc. We






The important point is that unilaterally becoming open beneﬁts the country that becomes
open. For example, if I = 10, then the gains to the opened country are 25 percent. If
I = 100, then the gains are 56 percent. These estimates of the gains to opening are large.
3.3. Transition analysis
Now we turn from analysis of a country’s situation when the economy is in a steady
state to analysis of the equilibrium adjustment path of a country that gradually opens. We
ﬁrst treat TFP growth rates as exogenous and equal to the same constant in all countries.
Next we model the relative TFP of the opening country as increasing with openness. The
examples analyzed are motivated by actual observations. In all cases, theory predicts large
gains for a country undergoing the transition to openness. We ﬁnd some interesting non-
monotonic patterns in consumption and technology capital investments when the time paths
of opening are diﬀerent across countries.5 Per capita consumptions and productivities even-
tually converge, but stocks of technology capital can be very diﬀerent across countries even
in the limit. When countries are totally open, what matters is the sum of the technology
5The case of symmetric time paths of opening is not considered here because the transition paths are
similar to a sequence of steady states.
21capital stocks, not the distribution of stocks across countries.
For our transition analysis, we relax several assumptions made earlier. Here, we allow
for elastically supplied labor and growth in population and technology. Utility ﬂow in this
case is given by
u(c,l) = logc + ϕlog(1 − l),
with ϕ = 2.5 so that hours of work are consistent with observations. The growth rate in
populations is γN = .01. The TFP parameters evolve according to Ait = (1 + γA)t, where
γA is set so that the interest rate (= ρ) is 4 percent after the transition occurs. In the limit,
output grows at rate γY given by
γY = [(1 + γA)(1 + γN)]
(1−(1−φ)α)/[(1−φ)(1−α)] − 1
and per capita output grows at rate γy = (1 + γY)/(1 + γN) − 1. In the example with TFP
rising as a country opens, we set Ait equal to a function of σit. Because we consider both the
direct eﬀects of changing σit and the indirect eﬀects of its change on Ait, we ﬁnd it convenient
to work here with the openness measure σ rather than with ω. Along the transition paths,
we constrain investments in both types of capital to be positive.
Transition with TFPs on trend
Here we consider the equilibrium paths in two examples. In Example 5, a small,
closed country joins a large, open country (or existing union). In Example 6, two similar-
sized countries open to each other at diﬀerent times.
Example 5. Joining a Larger Open Economy
In this example, we reconsider the situation of the steady state of Example 2: a small
country opening to a larger country or group of countries that are already open. This, again,
is motivated by the situation of Canada forming an economic union with the United States.
It also applies to that of a small European country joining the EU.
22The two countries here are, again, of size N1 = 10 and N2 = 1. We normalize the
initial TFP parameters by setting them equal to one across time and countries. The big
country is actually a union of countries or states that are open to each other but not to
the small country. In period 1, this big country opens up to the small country. The small
country starts out closed and gradually opens to the big country.
Figure 9: Openness Parameters Path (Example 5)
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Figure 9 plots the paths of the openness parameter for the two countries, namely σit,
for i = 1,2. For t ≥ 1, the openness parameter for the big country is σ1,t = 0.99, which
implies ω1,t = 0.85.6 In year 1, the small country is closed. Subsequently, the degree of
openness for the small country increases to that of the big country. This choice of paths
is motivated by evidence on the slow adjustments of GDP per hour after economic unions
are formed. The slow adjustment of σ2t is due in part to political forces—which we treat
exogenously here—preventing an immediate opening to foreign multinational activity.7
6Because of numerical issues with investment constraints near 1, we choose the maximum value for the
degree of openness σit to be 0.99 for all i and t.
7When the openness parameters are equal and ﬁxed in all periods of the transition, the results can be
23We also need to set initial conditions for the capital stocks. We set the capital stocks
in year 0 to the balanced growth values for closed economies with N1 = 10 and N2 = 1.
Figure 10: Per Capita Consumption Relative to c2,0(1 + γy)t (Example 5)
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Figure 10 shows the paths of per capita consumption for the two countries. Both series
are divided by the growth trend of per capita output (1+γy)t times the small country’s initial
per capita consumption level c2,0, which is the level of consumption for a closed economy
with a population of size 1. The paths are clearly quite diﬀerent. The consumption in the big
country remains relatively stable and converges to a level that is about 1 percentage point
above the level of consumption it had prior to opening. In contrast, consumption in the
small country initially falls relative to c2,0 and then increases dramatically as it opens up to
foreign direct investment from the big country. In the limit, the small country’s consumption
level is about 27 percent higher than the level prior to opening.
Initially, virtually all of the small country consumption gains are from returns on
read oﬀ our steady-state formulas.
24its technology being used in the big country. Figure 11 shows the paths for technology
capital in the two countries relative to trend output in the small country. More speciﬁcally,
the ﬁgure plots technology capital stocks divided by the growth trend of aggregate output
(1+γY)t times the small country’s initial output level. Although both countries start with a
technology capital stock equal to 0.5 times output, the big country is ten times bigger and,
therefore, does most of the world’s investment in technology capital. In year 1, when the
big country opens to FDI from the small country, investment in technology capital soars in
the small country because the small country takes advantage of the fact that its capital can
now be used in more locations.
As the small country opens to FDI by multinationals in the big country, it becomes
advantageous for the small country to exploit the large stock of technology capital from
abroad. Because of its size disadvantage, there comes a time during the transition when
the small country stops investing in technology capital and lets its own stock depreciate
thereafter. For this example, this occurs in year 23. When both countries are eﬀectively open,
their per capita consumption and labor input are equal, but specialization in production
persists, with only the big country investing in technology capital.
The equilibrium path of the small country’s actual productivity, but not its measured
productivity, is similar to that of per capita consumption. As Figure 11 makes clear, mea-
sured and actual productivity have very diﬀerent paths because measured output excludes
investment in technology capital. The large initial increases in the small country’s invest-
ment in technology capital implies that its measured productivity is initially low relative to
the period before opening up to foreign technologies. For two years, the small country does
not invest in plant-speciﬁc capital K but instead builds M. During this time, measured
productivity is roughly half of its initial level. After that, investment in technology capital
slows, but measured productivity does not recover to its initial level until after year 22.
An important lesson to be drawn from this example is that measured productivity
will seem to show that opening has an adverse eﬀect on the small country, when in fact it
has a very positive eﬀect. Rapid growth in measured productivity occurs at the point where
25Figure 11: Technology Capital Relative to Y2,0(1 + γY)t (Example 5)
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the small country’s technology capital starts to decline, and it takes ﬁve years to catch up to
that of the big country. Eventually, measured productivity surpasses that of the big country
because true productivities are the same, but only the big country invests in technology
capital. This example thus shows that measured productivity can give a distorted picture of
actual economic performance.
Example 6. Opening at Diﬀerent Times
Now we turn to a diﬀerent situation: two similar-sized countries opening to each other
at diﬀerent times. We think of this as the EU opening to FDI from the United States and later
the United States opening to FDI from the EU. That is because after World War II, the EU-6
countries had a population similar to that of the United States, but European companies
did little foreign direct investment in the United States compared to what U.S. companies
did in Europe. According to a report of the U.S. Secretary of Commerce [14], both currency
undervaluation under the Bretton Woods system of exchange rates and high taxes on foreign
26borrowing as a result of the interest equalization tax acted as strong disincentives to foreign
direct investment in the United States.
Figure 12: Openness Parameters Path (Example 6)
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Here, we set N1 = 10 and N2 = 10 and assume that the initial capital stocks are equal
for the two countries in year 0. In this example, the only diﬀerence between the countries is
the timing of their opening. The assumed paths of the openness parameters are plotted in
Figure 12.
Figure 13 shows how seemingly similar-sized economies, such as the United States
and the European Union, can be very diﬀerent in terms of their multinational activity.
The country opening ﬁrst exploits the more closed economy by using its technology capital.
Therefore, it drops its investment in technology capital during the period when the relative
σ’s are most diﬀerent. Eventually, the country opening ﬁrst does increase its investment
in technology capital, although the level of this investment is much lower than that in the
country opening second.
If the countries were to open up further, then the paths of technology capital would
27Figure 13: Technology Capital Relative to Y2,0(1 + γY)t (Example 6)
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depend on the relative sizes of the parameter σ. When the countries are both fully open,
nothing in the theory pins down the relative sizes of the technology capital stocks. Thus,
it is possible for countries to have the same standard of living but very diﬀerent levels of
foreign direct investment.
Transition with TFP increasing with openness
Recall that up to now, we have assumed that the TFP parameters in our economies
are unaﬀected by openness. Yet, a country’s relative TFP parameter might increase (relative
to trend) when it becomes open for at least three reasons. One is that the TFP parameter
is likely to be increased by the increased competition resulting from opening. Studies have
examined the role of competition on productivity [6, 7] and found that competition leads to
increased productivity. Others [1] have reviewed ﬁrm-level data that suggest that when a
country’s industry faces new foreign competition, its productivity increases to world levels.
A second reason to think that the TFP parameter increases with opening is that the entry
28of foreign multinational production diﬀuses knowledge into the opening country. A third
reason is that when a country enters into a formal or informal association of open countries,
typically it is required or ﬁnds it in its interest to adopt regulatory labor market and other
policies that foster productivity. In particular, to attract FDI, a country must create a good
environment for businesses. This is part of being open.
Example 7. Increasing Eﬃciency
In our ﬁnal example, we assume that TFP rises in the economy that opens to foreign
direct investment. This example is motivated by the experience of the Central European
countries gaining eﬃciency as they have opened.8
Here, we slightly modify Example 5 (where a small closed country joined a larger
open one) by assuming that the small country gains in eﬃciency as it opens up. Our
measure of the eﬃciency gains is the increase in A2,t/A1,t over time, with the rate of increase
proportional to the rate of increase in σ2,t, which we saw in Figure 9. In year 0, when closed,
the small country has a TFP parameter A2,0 = 0.9A1,0. During the transition, we assume
that A2,t/A1,t = 0.9 + 0.1σ2,t and that A1,t = (1 + γA)t.
Figure 14 shows the result for per capita consumption. There we plot the consump-
tion path of the small country joining the big country, again as a percentage of the initial
consumption in the small country. For comparison, we also plot the per capita consumption
path in the case with no diﬀusion. The result for this case is the line marked A2,t = 0.9A1,t.
If there is no diﬀusion, the relative TFP parameters remain at 0.9 and do not increase with
openness.
Without diﬀusion, the gains to openness for the small country are about 30 percent
by year 60. The additional gains to an increase in TFP of 10 percentage points is 20 percent,
implying an overall gain to the smaller country joining the union of about 50 percent when
compared to the consumption level when closed.
In summary, we have demonstrated here and with our earlier examples that the
8Lucas [9] has emphasized the importance of diﬀusion of knowledge and its role in development.
29Figure 14: Per Capita Consumption Relative to c2,0(1 + γy)t (Example 7)
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A2,t = (0.9+0.1σ2,t) A1,t
A2,t = 0.9 A1,t
%
potential gains from opening to FDI are large, providing theoretical support for a widely
held view that the gains to economic integration are large.
4. Conclusions
In this paper, we extend the neoclassical growth model by introducing technology
capital, which is a ﬁrm’s unique know-how, and the concept of location, which permits the
introduction of technology capital without requiring aggregate nonconvexities. The theoret-
ical structure interacts well with the national accounts and the international accounts.
We used our extended model to provide quantitative theoretical support buttressing
the empirical evidence that openness leads to large gains in the opening economy. The main
avenue for gains in our theory is the exploitation of other countries’ technology capital, which
is done by permitting FDI.
One conclusion that can be drawn from our work is that there are gains to openness
30even for countries that do little or no investment in technology capital. If countries are open,
the world level of technology capital, not its distribution, is what matters. Furthermore, as
countries open, those ﬁrms that are making technology capital investments have suﬃcient
private incentives to engage in direct investment abroad. Thus, our framework provides
little theoretical support for proposals such as the Barcelona European Council’s proposal
to provide direct public funding to ensure that R&D spending is 3 percent of EU’s GDP.
We view the framework developed here as potentially useful for further theoretical
and applied research in the areas of economic development, international macroeconomics,
and trade. More detailed studies could and should be done to analyze the economic beneﬁts
of economic integration in speciﬁc cases. Elsewhere [11], we use the model developed here to
address a puzzle in the U.S. current account and net asset position. With some extensions
to include diﬀerent industries, the model may also prove useful for studying issues in trade,
especially as it relates to the trade-oﬀ of exporting versus direct investment.
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31Appendix: Data details
1. Deﬁnitions and units
Europe and the United States. For European countries and the United States, labor pro-
ductivity is deﬁned as total gross domestic product (GDP) per annual hours worked. The





where i denotes a country in the group considered—for example, EU-6. Hence, the implicit
assumption is that countries are weighted by their share of hours worked in total hours of
the group.
South America and Asia. Data for GDP per annual hour worked in South America and Asia
are scarce, so we measure productivity in these regions as GDP per person employed. This
labor productivity is calculated as
P
i∈I GDP per person employedi × Populationi P
i∈I Populationi
.
The total GDP and GDP per person employed for a given country are measured in
millions of U.S. dollars (converted at Geary-Khamis PPPs). Hence, labor productivity is
expressed in 1990 Geary-Khamis dollars.
2. Sources
Before 1950. For all countries, data before 1950 are from [10]. Table C-16a (p. 249) reports
GDP in 1990 Geary-Khamis dollars, and Table J-5 (pp. 180–183) reports labor productivities
in 1990 Geary-Khamis dollars per hour.
1950–2005. For all countries, data for the years 1950–2005 are from Groningen Growth
and Development Center (GGDC), Total Economy Database. Go to http://www.ggdc.net/,
then Total Economy Database and download data. The data used here are Total Economy
Database, January 2007.
32References
[1] M. Baily and R. Solow, International productivity comparisons built from the ﬁrm level,
J. Econ. Perspect. 15 (2001) 151–172.
[2] R. Bourl` es and G. Cette, A comparison of structural productivity levels in the major
industrialised countries, OECD Econ. Stud. 41 (2005) 75–108.
[3] A. Burstein and A. Monge-Naranjo, Foreign know-how, ﬁrm control, and the income of
developing countries, NBER WP 13073, National Bureau of Economic Research, 2007.
[4] H. Cole, L. Ohanian, A. Riascos, and J. Schmitz, Latin America in the rearview mirror,
J. Monet. Econ. 52 (2005) 69–107.
[5] J. Eaton and S. Kortum, Technology, geography, and trade, Econometrica 70 (2002)
1741–1779.
[6] T. Holmes and J. Schmitz, Resistance to new technology and trade between areas,
Fed. Reserve Bank Minneapolis Quart. Rev. 19 (Winter 1995) 2–17.
[7] T. Holmes and J. Schmitz, A gain from trade: From unproductive to productive en-
trepreneurship, J. Monet. Econ. 47 (2001) 417–446.
[8] R. Lucas, On the size distribution of business ﬁrms, Bell J. Econ. 9 (1978) 508–523.
[9] R. Lucas, Trade and the diﬀusion of the industrial revolution, NBER WP 13286, Na-
tional Bureau of Economic Research, 2007.
[10] A. Maddison, Monitoring the World Economy, 1820–1992, Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development, Paris, 1995.
[11] E.R. McGrattan and E.C. Prescott, Technology capital and the U.S. current account,
Staﬀ Report 406, Fed. Reserve Bank Minneapolis, 2008.
[12] N. Ramondo, Size, geography, and multinational production, Mimeo, University of
Texas at Austin, 2007.
[13] J. Sachs and A. Warner, Economic reform and the process of global integration, Brook-
ings Pap. Econ. Act. 1 (1995) 1–95.
33[14] U.S. Department of Commerce, Foreign Direct Investment in the United States, Report
of the Secretary of Commerce in Compliance With the Foreign Investment Study Act
of 1974, Government Printing Oﬃce, Washington, DC, 1976.
34Table I. Parameter Values
Production parameters α = 0.3, φ = 0.07
Depreciation rates δk = 0.053, δm = 0.10
Interest rate ρ = 0.04
35Table II. Per Capita Consumption (with Y2 = 100 when ω = 0)
Fraction of FDI Permitted
Gain
Country ω = 0 ω = 1 (%)
Big, N1 = 10 101.3 102.6 1.3
Small, N2 = 1 79.1 99.8 26.1
36Table III. Per Capita Output (with y=1 when I=1, ω=0)
Fraction of FDI Permitted
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Countries, I ω = 0 ω = 1/3 ω = 2/3 ω = 1
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20 1 1.239 1.325 1.380
21 1 1.245 1.332 1.387
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